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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
SANDRA BEYNON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
ST. GEORGE - DIXIE LODGE 
# 1743, BENEVOLENT & 
PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS, 
Defendant/Appellee 
Case No. 91-0551 
REPLY OF APPELLANT 
TO BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
CONPOR 
APPEAL PROM THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE PHILIP EVES, JUDGE PRESIDING 
Trial Court Case No. 90-050-3229 
Plaintiff\Appellant, SANDRA BEYNON (hereinafter "Ms. 
Beynon"), by and through her counsel of record John Pace and 
Brian M. Barnard of the Utah Legal Clinic on behalf of the 
Utah Civil Rights and Liberties Foundation, Inc., submits 
the following BRIEF in response to the amicus curiae brief 
filed by the Conference of Private Organizations (herein-
after "CONPOR" or "amicus") and dated October 15, 1992. 
1 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
The statement of Essential Facts on Appeal by the 
CONPOR is remarkable in several ways. Amicus CONPOR Brief 
(hereinafter "CONPOR Brief") at 2-3. There are no citations 
to the trial record. Several "facts" mentioned are not of 
record in this case (whether true or not) and many are 
irrelevant— for example, the defendant/appellee, St. 
George-Dixie Lodge #1743, Benevolent and Protective Order of 
Elks (hereinafter the "Lodge" or the "Elks Lodge") has an 
"occupancy permit" for its building and a "health permit" 
for its dining facility, the Lodge does not receive public 
funds, the Lodge's building is not on public property, the 
Lodge gets its electricity and water from the municipal 
systems, etc.1 Given its displayed lack of knowledge of the 
1
 Perhaps these "facts" were just left on a word 
processor from when CONPOR filed an amicus brief in some 
other case. Similarly, CONPOR's lengthy discussion of 
"state action" (CONPOR Amicus Brief, pp. 5-12) seems to be 
taken from another brief and shoved into CONPOR's brief 
herein. "State action," which might be relevant under a 
14th Amendment analysis in federal court, is not relevant in 
this case. 
CONPOR also seems to think that plaintiff wants the 
Court to order the state to remove or deny defendant a 
liquor license (Id., p. 4; p. 5; p. 17) plaintiff has not so 
requested in this action. Denial of or the removal of the 
defendant's liquor licenses has never been an issue. 
Needless to say if the St. George Elks Lodge were to 
give up its state liquor and beer licenses,- it would no 
longer be "an enterprise regulated by the state" subject ta 
the Utah Civil Rights Act. The Civil Rights Act would then 
2 
issues and facts of this case, CONPOR's service to the Court 
as an amicus curiae in this case must be questioned. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The "male-only" membership policies of the Elks Lodge 
violate the Utah Civil Rights Act. No reading of the 
statute nor arguments forwarded by the CONPOR can put the 
Lodge7s discriminatory practices beyond the reach of this 
important civil rights legislation. Indeed, the blatant 
gender discrimination by the Lodge — coupled with the fact 
that this conduct is associated with the auspices of the 
state — represents the exact behavior that Utah's anti-
discrimination statute declares unlawful. When the Elks 
Lodge specifically excludes women from its membership, it 
perpetuates the offensive and humiliating effects of gender 
discrimination and endangers the health and welfare of 
Utah's citizens. 
To guarantee all individuals "full and equal 
availability of all goods, services and facilities" 
regardless of their sex, the Utah Civil Rights Act forbids 
gender discrimination by all business establishments and 
apply only because the Elks Lodge is a "business establish-
ment ." 
3 
enterprises regulated by the state. U.C.A. §§ 13-7-1, et 
seq. (1953 as amended). The Lodge — engaged in public and 
commercial activities — is a business establishment for the 
purposes of the Act. In addition, as the beneficiary of 
state beer and liquor licenses, the Lodge is an enterprise 
regulated by the state. 
Accordingly, the Elks Lodge cannot legitimately plead 
exemption to Utah's civil rights legislation. The Lodge has 
long forsaken any claims of intimacy and private association 
by actively seeking and accepting state licenses to sell 
beer and alcohol and by offering its facilities and services 
to the public. Far from occurring in surroundings analogous 
one's home and amongst individuals who share relationship 
similar to family members, the gender discrimination 
practiced by the Elks Lodge takes place publicly, commer-
cially and pervasively. 
Finally, given the distinct trend in other juris-
dictions to prevent male-only clubs from excluding women as 
members, application of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the 
Elks Lodge is over due. Importantly, civil rights 
legislation with narrower sweeps and less exacting texts 
than the Utah statute has been repeatedly interpreted as 
prohibiting the exclusionary membership policies adopted by 
4 
the Lodge. Case law which has enforced language and purpose 
similar to that of Utah lawmakers also confirms that the 
statute prohibits the Lodge's discriminatory conduct. In 
light of the firm legal, policy, and moral foundations for 
Ms. Beynon's claim that she is entitled not to be classified 
and restricted based solely upon her gender, CONPOR's 
arguments necessarily fail. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Enforcement of the Utah Civil Rights Act Against the 
Elks Lodge is Not Dependant on the Presence of State Action. 
Demonstrating unfamiliarity with state civil rights 
legislation in general, and the Utah Civil Rights Act in 
particular, CONPOR expends considerable space and effort to 
argue that Utah's licensing of the Lodge is insufficient to 
constitute state action.2 Amicus CONPOR's Brief at 5-12. 
However, Ms. Beynon's claim is not based upon the federal 
Bill of Rights nor upon the power of Congress to regulate 
conduct under the federal commerce clause. Instead, Ms. 
Beynon asserts that the Lodge's discriminatory membership 
practices violate the Utah Civil Rights Act — state 
2
 Interestingly, CONPOR cites only federal cases in 
its amicus brief, seeming to ignore that this is a state 
claim brought in state court under Utah's unique state civil 
rights statute. 
5 
legislation enacted pursuant to Utah's authority to police 
the health and safety of its citizens. Such regulatory 
"police" power clearly belongs to Utah. In any case, the 
Lodge has not challenged the authority of the state to 
prohibit discrimination and defends itself in this action by 
maintaining that the Utah Civil Rights Act was not intended 
to reach Elk Lodge activities. 
The Utah Attorney General, as a statutory party to this 
action, also confirms that "state action" is not relevant to 
this case: 
Although Utah could probably show "state action" 
in its farther reaching involvement as an active 
market participant in the liquor industry, it is a 
completely different question of whether Utah may 
prohibit discrimination, as an additional 
regulation upon the liquor industry as part of its 
police powers. 
Brief of Attorney General at 18 (emphasis original).3 Ms. 
Beynon's claim has never rested upon state action and the 
application of federal anti-discrimination protections, but 
3
 As the Attorney General points out in his Brief, the 
Lodge shares CONPOR's confusion of the issues in this case. 
Many of the Lodge's arguments for exemption from Utah's 
antidiscrimination statute mistakenly rely upon federal 
civil rights claims that are ultimately decided upon the 
matter of state action. Because the question of state 
action is not before this Court, the relevancy of these is 
cases is minimal. See, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Ivris, 407 
U.S. 124 (1972) (a state licensing scheme insufficient state 
action for the purposes of federal equal protection law). 
6 
instead is based upon state protections and the authority of 
the state to regulate the conduct of persons, even private 
actors within the state. Accordingly, state action is not 
an issue before this Court.4 
II. The Elks Lodge is Subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
As a business establishment and an enterprise regulated 
by the state, the Lodge is prohibited from discriminating 
against Ms. Beynon on the basis of her sex. A holder of 
state licenses to sell beer and alcohol, the Lodge has 
solicited and submitted to state supervision including the 
state legislation which prohibits gender discrimination. In 
addition, the Lodge conducts itself as a business, making 
4
 In arguing that there is no state action in this 
case, CONPOR advances other unpersuasive contentions. For 
example, the amicus contends that a practicing attorney — 
presumably in Utah — can refuse to represent a client for 
any discriminatory reason. CONPOR fails to realize that the 
Utah Civil Rights Act specifically prohibits an attorney 
from discriminating against clients on the basis of an 
invidious classification. A practicing attorney in Utah is 
a business establishment and her office is a place of public 
accommodation for the purposes of the Utah Civil Rights Act 
and her conduct is subject to the state's antidiscrimi-
nation mandate. 
Oddly, CONPOR also warns (or imagines) that application 
of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the Lodge would open 
religious organizations to regulation by the state. 
CONPOR's Brief at 10. Again the amicus exhibits 
unfamiliarity with Utah's civil rights legislation which 
specifically exempts churches from the reach of the statute. 
U.C.A. § 13-7-3 (1953 as amended). 
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substantial sums of money by selling liquor, beer and food, 
running what is essentially a public restaurant, and renting 
its facilities to the public. The Lodge's business-like 
traits — including its utilization of its state liquor and 
beer licenses — coupled with its solicitation and 
acceptance of state regulation indicate that the Elks Lodge 
is welL within the reach of Utah's anti-discrimination 
edict.5 
5
 Throughout its brief, CONPOR repeatedly stresses 
that a liquor license issued to a "private" club such as the 
Lodge, is a substantial benefit to the club. Indeed, CONPOR 
would consider the denial or cancellation of this license to 
be akin to punishment of the Lodge. CONPOR Brief at 4-5 
(for example, "Plaintiff and the Attorney General do not 
seek redress but punishment of the Lodge by imposition of a 
financial hardship through removal of their [sic] liquor 
license." ) (emphasis added). CONPOR's admission underlines 
the extent to which the Lodge is a beneficiary of state 
privileges and state regulation and the extent to which 
these privileges are essential to the economic well-being of 
the Lodge. CONPOR's emphasis upon the importance of the 
Lodge's commercial nature — centered around the selling of 
beer and alcohol — only reaffirms Ms. Beynon's assertion 
that the Lodge is a business. In addition, CONPOR points 
out that the commercial success of the Lodge is dependent on 
a state privilege. Because Utah lawmakers determined that 
whenever extensive state regulation entangle the state in 
the affairs of the monitored enterprise — and CONPOR points 
out how extensive and important this entanglement is — 
discrimination could not be tolerated for fear that this 
undesirable conduct would be encourage by or associated with 
the state's presence and support. 
When CONPOR suggests that Ms. Beynon is seeking to 
punish the Lodge, CONPOR is in error. Ms. Beynon seeks 
redress only in the form of injunctive and declaratory 
relief, not in the form of money damages. Ms. Beynon is 
only cisking this Court to enforce the law and put an end to 
the Lodge's invidious discrimination. 
8 
A. The Elks Lodge is an Enterprise Regulated by the State. 
The purpose, the language and the policy of the Utah 
Civil Rights Act all command otherwise, nevertheless CONPOR 
argues that the statute is not applicable to the Elks Lodge. 
Ignoring the directive that the Utah Civil Rights Act is to 
be liberally construed, CONPOR suggests a narrow reading of 
"enterprises regulated by the state" to exempt the Lodge 
from the statute.6 Yet, CONPOR offers no credible reasons 
as to why the Lodge — a beneficiary of state beer and 
liquor licenses and subject to supervision by the state — 
is not an enterprise or business regulated by the state.7 
6
 CONPOR asserts without citation to any authority 
that enterprises regulated by the state "must be considered 
in connection with the more limiting language describing 
business establishments and places of public accommodation." 
CONPOR Brief at 15. Yet, CONPOR fails to note that the 
statute does not limit or define "business establishments" 
in any way. Indeed, the similar absence of a definition or 
a listing of examples of "business establishments" prompted 
the California Supreme Court to interpret the term as 
broadly as reasonably possible. Burks v. Poppy Construction 
Company, 370 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1962). 
7
 CONPOR argues that the Lodge is not an enterprise 
regulated by the state by pointing to supposed contra-
dictions in the Attorney General's Brief. First, CONPOR 
misstates the Attorney General's position, wrongly insisting 
that the Attorney General "acknowledged that the Lodge is 
not a *business' within the meaning of the term *business 
establishment' because it is not open to the public and is 
not operated for profit." CONPOR Brief at 16. Actually, 
the Attorney General merely noted that the definition of 
"business establishments" would include "all profit 
motivated or commercially oriented entities . . . " Indeed, 
the Attorney General then argued that the Lodge is a 
9 
If CONPOR's less than reflective interpretation of the 
Utah Civil Rights Act were adopted, the legislative intent 
to have the Act construed liberally would be frustrated. In 
addition, the 1973 amendment to the Utah Civil Rights Act, 
meant to extend the application of the act to enterprises 
regulated by the state, would be made superfluous. Because 
the Act before 1973 already prohibited discrimination in 
"all business establishments," the new provision including 
enterprises regulated by the state must be read as expanding 
the scope of Utah/s civil rights legislation beyond business 
establishments. Accordingly, "business" for the purpose of 
state regulation after 1973 cannot be limited to those 
"business establishments" subject to the Act prior to 1973. 
By expanding the scope of Utah's civil rights 
legislation in 1973 to reach enterprises regulated by the 
state, Utah lawmakers expressed deep concern that invidious 
discrimination not be associated with state regulation, 
authorization or privilege. Lawmakers determined that when 
discrimination has the appearance of state assistance or 
"business" for the purposes § 13-7-2 (3)b of the Utah Civil 
Rights Act. Brief of Attorney General, pp. 6 et. seq. 
Second, CONPOR ignores Ms. Beynon's extensive arguments and 
references to state case law which indicate that the term 
"business establishment" includes more than just profit 
motivated entities open to the general public. Appellant's 
Reply Brief at 12-2 0. 
10 
approval, it is particularly objectionable. Thus, a proper 
interpretation of the Act is that exactly because the Elks 
Xodge is licensed by the state to sell beer and liquor, it 
is an enterprise regulated by the state. Utah does not 
allow truly private actors, ordinary citizens, to sell beer 
and alcohol from their residences, and therefore the state 
considers every entity that it licenses to sell beer a 
business. 
B. The Elks Lodge is a Business Establishment 
Further, CONPOR's argument that the Elks Lodge is not a 
business which sells beer and alcohol and is not a business 
establishment rests on the same misconception that a non-
profit membership organization cannot be a business. 
However, a multitude of state and federal court decisions 
have held otherwise. United State Jaycees v. McClure, 305 
N.W.2d 764, 768-769 (Minn. 1981); Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (local chapters of the Jaycees 
held to be "business facilities" for the purpose of the 
Minnesota Civil Rights Act although a nonprofit membership 
organization); Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs. of 
Rotary International, 224 Cal.Rptr. 213 (Cal.App.2 Dist. 
1986), Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, 
481 U.S. 537 (1987) (Rotary Club, a private, non-profit 
11 
corporation, a "business establishment'); O'Connor v. 
Village Green Owners Association, 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983) 
(condominium association, a non-profit association, a 
"business establishment"); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa 
Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985) (Boys' Club, a private, 
non-profit corporation, affiliated with the Boys' Club of 
America, a "business establishment"); Curran v. Mount Diablo 
Council of Boy Scouts, 195 Cal.Rptr. 325 (Cal.App.2 Dist.. 
1983) (Boy Scouts, a non-profit organization a "business 
establishment"); Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 
262 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Cal.App.l Dist. 1989) (a non-profit, 
privately owned and operated, social and recreational club a 
"business establishment"); Lloyds Lions Club v. Int. 
Association of Lions Clubs, 724 P.2d 887 (Or.App. 1986), 
petition for review dismissed, 740 P.2d 182 (Or. 1987) 
(nonprofit, private, selective membership club). 
As are the various organizations involved in the 
foregoing cases, the Lodge is a non-profit, membership 
organization that is a business for the purposes of the 
relevant civil rights legislation. The Lodge exhibits 
enough of the characteristics of a commercial enterprise, 
and is sufficiently open to the public to constitute a 
business. In addition to its state licenses to sell beer 
and alcohol, the Lodge has a St. George City business 
12 
license. Brief of Appellant at 10. In return for the 
privilege of being granted these state licenses, the Elks 
Lodge must have a current city business license and must 
abide by extensive state guidelines that govern the 
distribution of beer and liquor. Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Act, Title 32A, Utah Code Ann. (1986) . Far from a small or 
intimate operation, the Elks Lodge sells one-quarter of a 
million dollars ($250,000.00) of liquor annually and has 
assets that exceed one million three hundred thousand 
dollars ($1,300,000.00+). Appellant's Brief at 10. For 
example, for the 198 6 fiscal year, the lodge earned 
$25,197.00 from rental of its facility. 
Interestingly, a Michigan State Circuit Court recently 
ruled that under its Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 
Michigan Complied Laws (MCL) §§ 37.101, et seg,8 the 
Rochester Michigan Elks Lodge was prohibited from rejecting 
a woman's membership application solely on the basis of her 
gender. Schellenberg v. Rochester, Michigan Elks Lodge No. 
2225, No. 88-351-793-NZ (Mich.Cir.Ct. Nov. 15, 1989), 
decision attached as Exhibit "D". This ruling was based 
upon the commercial and public nature of the Rochester 
Lodge. Even though the Michigan Civil Rights Act prohibits 
MSA 3.548(101), et seg. 
13 
discrimination only in places of public accommodation "whose 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise 
made available to the public," MCL 37.2301(a) (emphasis 
added), the Court had no difficulty in finding that the 
Rochester Lodge was a place of public accommodation. Id. at 
A.7. Significant to the Court's conclusion was that the 
Lodge "operated a de facto restaurant." Id. The Lodge also 
held weekly bingo games and an annual craft show open to the 
public. Id. Also contributing to the Court's determination 
that the Rochester Lodge dining facility was essentially 
public was the observation that although the Rochester Lodge 
dining room was theoretically open only to members and their 
guests, food and drinks were ordered and paid for without a 
showing of membership. Jd. at A.5 
Like its Rochester counterpart, the St. George Elks 
Lodge is an open and commercial enterprise. The St. George 
Lodge's dining and banquet facilities are open for private 
and business functions to its members, their families, their 
employers and their guests. Appellant's Brief at 11. In 
addition to serving food and beverages to lodge customers, 
the Elks Lodge is used for receptions, business meetings and 
parties and defendant rents the facility to the public for 
14 
similar events.9 Id. Non-members and members alike order 
and pay for food, drink and services they receive at the 
lodge, placing the lodge in direct competition with other 
businesses in St. George that also sell food and beverages. 
Id. Indeed, Ms. Beynon, obviously without a showing of 
membership, has purchased beer and wine at the lodge during 
the four (4) years prior to this suit. Id. at 11-12. 
The same factors which convinced the Michigan trial 
court that the Rochester Elks Lodge was a place of public 
accommodation are present in the instant case.10 The public 
and commercial nature of the St. George Lodge confirms that 
it is both a business that sells beer and alcohol and a 
business establishment. 
III. Federal First Amendment Guarantees of Freedom of 
Intimate and Expressive Association Do Not Prohibit 
Application of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the Elks Lodge. 
Truly private clubs are protected from state regulation 
by the right to freedom of association. Although CONPOR 
argues otherwise, the Lodge does not qualify as an intimate 
9
 For a non-member to rent the facility, she or he 
need only be sponsored by a member who must be present 
during the event. 
10
 The Schellenbera case now on appeal was argued 
before the Michigan Court of Appeals on November 4, 1992, 
Case Nos. 123738, 131716. 
15 
or expressive association. For many of the same reasons 
that the Lodge is an enterprise regulated by the state and 
is a business enterprise, it has relinquished any status as 
a truly private club. As emphasized above, the Lodge 
maintains a public and commercial profile, profiting from 
the state licensed sale of beer and liquor and from the 
rental of its facilities to the public. Because the Lodge 
has opened itself to state regulation, it cannot simultan-
eously claim immunity from state anti-discrimination 
supervision. 
Further factors confirm that the Lodge is not entitled 
to First Amendment protection -— the Lodge is not a small, 
intimate, selective organization. The United State Supreme 
Court has consistently held that the essence of privacy is 
selectivity. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Associ-
ation, 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting 
Park, 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969). If there is little or no 
selectivity in a club's membership, there is no basis to 
claim privacy. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609 (1984); Bd. of Directors of Rotary International v. 
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). The Lodge has the burden 
of establishing that its is deserves First Amendment 
protection. United States Power Squadrons v. State Human 
Rights Appeal Bd.. 542 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (NY 1983) ("[Club 
16 
members] have the burden of establishing its entitlement to 
exclusion. It is they who are familiar with the policies 
and practices of the club and have available the documents 
and records necessary to establish their claim."). 
To reject the claim by the Rochester Elks Lodge of 
private club exemption under the Michigan Elliot-Larsen 
Civil Rights Act and to First Amendment protection, the 
Michigan Circuit Court emphasized that the "factors of size 
and selectivity weigh heavily against finding [the Rochester 
Lodge] to be a private club." Rochester Elks Lodge, supra 
at A.8. Analyzing the identical admission criteria involved 
in the case at bar, the Michigan Court determined that at 
the Rochester Lodge, "membership procedure is a mere 
formality. No significant process of selection can be found 
in a process that weeds out less than two percent of the 
applicants."11 Id. Unimpressed by the Elks' list of 
11
 The Michigan Court found no difficulty in 
distinguishing Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of 
the Elks, 382 F.Supp 1182 (D.Conn 1974), which found a 
Connecticut Elks Lodge to be a private club under federal 
civil rights law. In Cornelius there was no evidence to 
counter the claim by the Connecticut Lodge that its 
membership procedure was genuinely selective. Rochester 
Lodge at A.8; Cornelius at 12 04. Cornelius also predated, 
by a decade, the Roberts, supra, and Rotary. supra, 
decisions, in which the United States Supreme Court examined 
the size, purpose, policies, selectivity and other relevant 
characteristics of each club. In contrast, the Michigan 
Court noted that Ms. Schellenberg had introduced convincing 
documentation that the Rochester Lodge was not a genuinely 
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membership standards, the Michigan Court noted that 
11
 [n]early all of the applicants who follow though with the 
[membership] process are accepted." Id. at A.4. 
Significantly, the Rochester Lodge had 1,800 member, and 
over the part 15 years, only 20 applicants had been 
rejected. Id. 
Like the Rochester Lodge, the St. George Lodge is an 
organization with a large membership and without a genuinely 
selective membership procedure. Like the Rochester Lodge, 
the St. George Lodge is not a truly private club. Although 
the Elks Lodges list ten (10) characteristics as its 
membership standards, these criteria are not applied to 
create a selective, intimate organization. Most, if not 
all, men who apply are allowed to join the Lodge. Three St. 
George Elks Lodge members testified that during their thirty 
one (31) , thirty eight (38) , and twenty nine (29) years of 
membership, they witnessed respectively, the rejection of no 
applications, maybe ten (10) applications and one (1) 
application for membership. Appellant's Brief at 8. From 
January, 1987 through June, 1989, the St. George Elks Lodge 
members approved every application for membership presented 
to them. Id. During those two and one half years, the 
selective club. Rochester Lodge at A.8. For further 
discussion of Cornelius, see Appellant's Brief at 9-12. 
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investigation committee, whose duty it was to review the 
qualifications of all applicants, never issued a negative 
report on any applicant. Id, 
Nor is the St. George Lodge a small and intimate 
association. While about ten percent (10%) of the 
membership drops out of the organization each year, the 
Lodge annually increases its membership by fifteen percent 
(15%). Appellants Brief at 8-9. At various Lodge 
meetings, Lodge members are repeatedly encouraged to recruit 
new membership. Id. Although the St. George Elks Lodge can 
have members only from Washington County, Utah and small 
adjoining areas of Nevada and Arizona, the lodge enjoys a 
large membership of more than one thousand (1,000+) men. 
Id. This figure represents more than 6% of the male 
population in Washington County and more than 8% of the male 
population in St. George City. Id. There is no limit on 
the number of men that can be members of the Elks Lodge. 
Because the Lodge has not conducted itself as a truly 
private club, it cannot claim First Amendment immunity from 
the reach of the Utah Civil Rights Act. Rather than 
maintaining selective membership standards, the Lodge has 
solicited a large membership and has admitted virtually 
every male that has wished to join. By offering its 
facilities for rent and by running a restaurant in which 
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non-members can purchase food and alcohol, the Lodge has 
opened itself to the public and lost any basis for a claim 
of protected privacy. Finally, the Lodge has accepted state 
licenses to sell beer and alcohol, voluntarily submitting to 
government supervision which necessarily falls upon the 
beneficiaries of these state privileges. No truly private 
organization invites a state regulating body into its inner 
sanctum. 
CONCLUSION 
The St. George Elks Lodge is not^insulated from the 
reach of the Utah Civil Rights Act. Utah has determined 
that individuals and our society are entitled to be free 
from the poisonous effects of unlawful discrimination. The 
Lodge has chosen to openly participate in our society, 
offering its services and facilities to the public, 
soliciting state benefits and profiting from state 
privileges. Yet, when asked to abide by the state enacted 
antidiscrimination law which serves the health and welfare 
of this society, suddenly the Lodge wants out. The Lodge 
does not want to treat the individuals who make up our 
society with equal respect. The Lodge wants to openly and 
unabashedly deny Ms. Beynon access to its goods, services 
and benefits simply because she is a women. This 
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discrimination is unfair, undesirable, and most importantly, 
unlawful. 
For these reasons and in the interest of justice, this 
Court should reverse the ruling and decision of the trial 
court, determine that the Utah Civil Rights Act applies to 
the Lodge and remand this case with instructions to the 
trial court to enter judgment in favor of Ms. Beynon 
granting declaratory and injunctive relief to end the 
illegal gender discrimination practiced by the Lodge. 
DATED this 13th day of NOVEMBER, 1992. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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EXHIBIT 
OPINION IN 
SCHELLENBERG VS. ROCHESTER. MICHIGAN ELKS LODGE 
CIRCUIT COURT FOR OAKLAND COUNTY, MICHIGAN 
CASE NO. 88-351-793 NZ 
NOVEMBER 15, 1989 
STATE OF MICHIGAN 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OAKLAND 
SHARON*LEE SCHELLENBERG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROCHESTER, MICHIGAN LODGE NO. 2225 
OF THE BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE 
ORDER OF ELKS OF THE USA, a non-
profit Michigan corporation, 
Defendants• 
/ 
O P I N I O N 
This Court has before it the parties' motion for 
a judgment on stipulated facts. MCR 2.116(A). Plaintiff brine 
this action under Section 302 of the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights 
Act, MCL 37.101, et se£, MSA 3.548(101), et sej, alleging that 
she has been denied full and equal enjoyment of the services 
of a place of public accommodation or public service because 
of sex. Defendant admits that it has refused plaintiff members 
in its organization but argues that it is not a place of public 
accommodation or public service as those terms are defined 
in the Act. Rather, defendant argues that it is a private 
club under Sec. 303 and therefore, exempt from the provisions 
of Sec. 302. 
Plaintiff is a realtor in the City of Rochester. 
For approximately seven years prior to this litigation she 
had enjoyed some of the defendant's services and facilities^ 
Plaintiff frequently ate lunch in the defendant's dining room 
on work days with business associates. The local Board of 
Realtors often rents the defendant's facility for its meetings, 
which plaintiff attejjgs. Plaintiff also takes her mother to 
the Elks Club for bingo on Wednesday nights. Plaintiff testif: 
Civil Action 
No. 88-351-793-NZ 
ATRUECOPY 
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that she ate at defendant's club so frequently that the doorperson 
would let her in without her showing any proof that her husband 
was a member. 
In February, 1988, plaintiff completed a written 
application for membership naming a sponsor member and two 
member references. Plaintiff wanted to join the Elks primarily 
because it was a convenient and customary place for lunch on 
weekdays* Also, it was an appropriate place where she could 
take her parents for dinner and dancing. It is not disputed 
that plaintiff's application was denied solely because she 
is female. 
Defendant is a local chapter of the Benevolent and 
Protective Order of Elks of the United States of America (BPOE). 
Defendant is incorporated in this stats as a fraternal association 
pursuant to MCL 457.301; MSA 21.1291 and MCL 450.133; MSA 21.134. 
Pursuant to defendant's Articles of Incorporation, it was formed, 
"to inculcate the principals of Charity, Justice, Brotherly 
Love and Fidelity to promote the welfare and enhance the happiness 
of its members; to quicken the spirit of American patriotism; 
to cultivate good fellowship; to perpetuate itself as a fraternal 
organization; and to provide for its government." Defendant 
is a non-profit tax-exempt corporation, in its promotional 
brochure, What it Means to Be an Elk, pp 15-16, the Elks national 
office proclaims: 
The primary object of the Order is the 
practice of charity in its broadest 
significance, not merely that of alms 
giving. 
# * * 
For many years the aggregate 
expenditure* Of the Subordinate Lodges 
for charitable purposes "have run into 
million* of dollars each year, covering 
humanitarian services of infinite variety. 
Among the mo***- J! of such activities 
may be raentic oe following: food 
rn oi 
to the hungry; shelter for the homeless; 
clothing and fuel for the needy; milk 
for the under-nourished babies; medical 
attention to the sick; baskets to the 
poor at Christmas and Thanksgiving; 
outings for underprivileged children; 
entertainments for shut-ins; education 
for young people; artificial limbs for 
the maimed; hospital beds; free clinics; 
night schools* And the list might be 
indefinitely extended. 
All of the State Elks Associations 
have undertaken important and extensive 
charitable works within their own several 
jurisdictions, determined by the particular 
conditions therein existing and the 
preferences of their constituent members. 
They include rehabilitation of crippled 
children, treatment of indigent tubercular 
patients, provision for scholarships to 
worthy students, maintenance of orphans, 
boys' camps, training of the blind, 
eyeglasses for needy boys and girls, 
cerebral palsy clinics, cancer clinics, 
and other state wide projects of similar 
character and of equal worthiness, which 
are being carried on as continuing 
activities. No history of social service 
in the United States would be complete 
without an inspiring chapter devoted to 
the achievements of the Order of Elks in 
this field. 
Membership in the Elks is limited to male citizens 
of the United States of America not under the age of 21. Elks 
Constitution, Art VII, Sec 4. Potential members must also be 
believers in God and possess good moral character. Elks Annotated 
Statute, § 14.010. Communists and persons who advocate the 
overthrow of the government by force are not permitted to join. 
The Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks has about 
1.5 million members nationwide and about 50,000 members in 78 
lodges in this state. In August, 1988, the defendant had 1,84; 
members. In 1987, 126 men applied for membership with defendant. 
One was rejected and three withdrew their applications. In 
1986, 119 men applied for membership with the defendant. One 
was rejected because he was nnt a United States citizen 
[A, 3] 
and three withdrew their applications. In 1985, 117 men applied 
for membership. None were rejected though five withdrew their 
applications. During these most recent years less than two 
percent of all applicants were rejected. Over the past 15 
years only 20 applicants have been rejected. 
The defendant recruits new members primarily through 
members' social contacts. Members are encouraged in the monthly 
newsletter to seek new members from among their friends. The 
recruit submits an application naming the sponsor member and 
two member references. If the application indicates that the 
applicant meets the four basic membership requirements the 
applicant is invited to sit for an interview. The interview 
is fairly short and informal. One member of the investigating 
committee who performed interviews stated that throughout over 
100 interviews that he had performed, he had recommended every 
applicant for membership. The applicant is considered for 
membership by the members in a vote. Three negative votes 
results in rejection of the applicant. Nearly all of the 
applicants who follow through with the process are accepted. 
The defendant charges its new members an initiation 
fee of $75 and each member pays annual dues of $75. Dues and 
fees account for approximately 70% of defendant's annual receipts. 
Defendant's next largest source of income is from rental of 
its facilities to other organizations. For example, in 1987 
and 1988, defendant rented its facilities to about 20 different 
organizations on about 90 different occasions. In 1988, rentals 
accounted for approximately 13% of defendant's income. Defendant 
derives approximately nine percent of its income from weekly 
bingo nights and less than two pe.rcent of its income from 
advertisements placed in its local newsletter. Defendant operates 
a dining room or restatiHBE for its members and their guests 
but does not appear to derive a profit from this activity. 
The parties stipulated at oral argument that only 
three percent of the defendant's income is directed to charitable 
organizations and activities. Defendant contributes $1 per 
member annually to the statewide Michigan Elks major projects. 
Defendant sponsors an annual hoop shoot for local youths and 
assists a local law enforcement agency in its drug awareness 
program. 
The defendant operates a dining room as one of the 
services it provides to its members. According to the defendant's 
own rules, the dining room is supposed to be open only to members 
and their guests. Guests are not supposed to be allowed to 
purchase their own alcoholic beverages or food. However, before 
this litigation commenced these rules were not enforced. One 
of defendant's own waitresses, Janice Kline, stated that she 
regularly provided separate checks for guests who requested 
separate checks. She was never told not to do this. She also 
served food and drinks without requesting to see membership 
identification. Two of plaintiff's female business associates 
stated that they have used defendant's dining hall even though 
they were not members. No one in their group was ever asked 
to show identification. They all received separate checks 
and paid for their own meals. 
The issue before this Court is whether the defendant's' 
decision to reject plaintiff's application solely on the basis 
of sex violated the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Section 302 
of the Act provides: 
Sec. 302. Except where permitted 
by law, a person shall not: 
(a) Deny an individual the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of a place of public 
acconut i or public service because 
of rel race, color, national 
origir. sex, or marital status. 
For purposes of this Section, defendant is a person. 
MCL 37.2103(f). 
MCL 37.2301(a) and (b) define place of public 
accommodation and public service as follows: 
(a) 'Place of public accommodation* 
means a business or an educational, 
refreshment, entertainment, recreation, 
health, or transportation facility, or 
institution of any kind, whether licensed 
or not, whose goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations 
are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise 
made available to the public. 
(b) 'Public service' means a public 
facility, department,* agency, board, orby or 
commission, owned, operated, or managed 
on behalf of the state, a political 
subdivision, or an agency thereof, or a 
tax exempt private agency established 
to provide service to the public. 
There is no Michigan case law further defining what 
constitutes a "public service" under the above-quoted statute. 
However, it is undisputed that defendant is a tax-exempt 
corporation. Furthermore, defendant's promotional literature 
makes clear that the primary object of the defendant is the 
practice of charity in its broadest significance including 
such activities as providing food for the hungry, shelter for 
the homeless, clothing for the needy and medical attention 
to the poor. Clearly, this is service to the public. 
At oral argument defendant's counsel repeatedly argued 
that defendant currently donates only three percent of its 
income to charitable causes. This Court would observe that 
the definition of public service looks to whether the agency 
was "established" to provide public service. Whether defendant 
has in fact all but abandoned the laudable purposes for which 
it was established has no bearing on the fact that defendant 
was established to provide public service. Therefore, this 
Court finds that defendant is a "public service" as that term 
is defined in the Act. 
rA £i 
Having found defendant to be a public service it is not 
necessary that this Court determine whether defendant is a 
place of public accommodation. Traditional places of public 
accommodation include hotels and restaurants. Concord Rod & 
Gun Club, Inc v Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 
402 Mass 716; 524 NE2d 1364 (1988). In this case, defendant 
operated a de facto public restaurant. Further, they opened 
to the public for weekly bingo games and annual gift and craft 
shows. Therefore, this Court concludes that defendant is a 
place of public accommodation. 
Defendant argues that even if it falls within the 
definitions of § 302, it is entitled to the private club exemption 
under § 303 of the Act: 
Sec. 303. This article shall not 
apply to a private club, or other 
establishment not in fact open to the 
public, except to the extent that the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of the 
private club or establishment are made 
available to the customers or patrons 
of another establishment that is a place 
of public accommodation or is licensed 
by the state under Act No. 8 of the 
Public Acts of 1933, being sections 436.1 
through 436.58 of the Michigan Compiled 
Laws. MCL 37.2303; MSA 3.548(310). 
In Rogers v International Association of Lions Club, 
636 F Supp 1476, 1479 (ED Mich 1986), the Court considered 
four factors in determining the Lions Club was not a private 
club under this Section: "The organization's size, selectivity, 
public services offered, and use of public facilities." The 
Court placed special emphasis on selectivity. In Cornelius v 
Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F Supp 1182 (D Conn 
1974), the Court considered eight factors in determining that 
the Groton, Connecticut Elks Club was a private club under 
similar federal legislation. The Court found that the most 
significant factors were selectivity, formal membership procedure 
and membership control over the admission of new members. 
In the absence of controlling Michigan case law, federal case 
law may be. helpful in deciding civil rights cases. Bouwman v 
Chrysler Corp, 114 Mich App 670, 678 (1982). However, this 
case must be decided on its own facts. 
In this case the factors of size and selectivity 
weigh heavily against finding defendant to be a private club. 
Defendant has over 1,800 members and the only limitations on 
its size are recently self-imposed. Nationally, there are 
1.5 million members. Like the Lions, the Elks are potentially 
unlimited in size. Rogers, supra, p 1479. The defendant has 
the same formal membership procedure as was outlined in Cornelius, 
supra. This case indistinguishable from Cornelius in that 
plaintiff has presented facts showing that the membership 
procedure is a mere formality. No significant process of 
selection can be found in a process that weeds out less than 
two percent of the applicants, most of whom were disqualified 
for reasons pertaining to citizenship. As stated in Rogers, 
supra, p 1480, "the essence of privacy is selectivity. If 
there is little or no selectivity, there is no basis to the 
claim of privacy." This Court finds that defendant has not 
conducted itself as a private club and therefore, does not 
qualify for the private club exemption. 
Defendant also argues that any decision which forces if 
to open its doors to women will violate its members1 constitutions 
right to choose with whom they will freely associate. This 
Court is not blind to the fact that persons of the same gender 
may wish to form an association for mutual enrichment, friendship 
and close ties. Such relationships should be protected from 
state intrusion. This type of constitutional argument was 
recognized in Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 
104 S Ct 3244, 82 Ed 2d 462 (1984). It appears that the same 
factors which make a private club truly private also give rise 
to the types of relationships which the right of association 
insulates from governmental interference: 
Among other things, therefore, they are 
distinguished by such attributes as 
relative smallness, a high degree of 
selectivity in decisions to begin and 
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion 
from others in critical aspects of the 
relationship. As a general matter, 
only relationships with these sorts of 
qualities are likely t^ reflect the 
considerations that have led to -an 
understanding of freedom of association 
as an intrinsic element of personal 
liberty. 
Roberts, supra, 468 CTS 670. For the ^ame reasons that this 
Court finds defendant not to be a private club this Court also 
finds defendant not to be the type of organization protected 
by the right of association. Defendant simply is neither small 
nor selective. Defendant lacks the distinctive characteristics 
that might afford constitutional protection to its decision 
to exclude women members. 
Finally, at oral argument defendant argued that by 
requiring it to admit women to membership, this Court will 
discourage the Elks and other men's organizations from pursuing 
charitable activities. This Court fi^ds it hard to believe 
that the prospect of having to admit Vomen would cause the 
defendant to abandon its primary objective of "charity in its 
broadest significance." Opening the qoors to female membership 
in the Lions and Jaycees has not sounqed the death knell for 
these charitable organizations. Furthermore, nothing in this 
Opinion should be construed to mean that private male-only 
associations lose their privilege to Exclude women when they 
do charitable works. p*+*~r, that privilege is lost when the 
club abandons its priva- .racterist.iC3 Qf smallness and 
selectivity of membership. 
For the foregoing reasons this Court finds that the 
decision of .the Rochester Elks to reject plaintiff's application 
violates the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Defendant is ordered 
to reconsider plaintiff's application without consideration 
of gender. The issue of costs and attorney fees is reserved 
for later decision. 
HILDA R. fcASe 
cmcurrjuooe 
HILDA R. GAGE 
Circuit Court Judge 
Dated: November. 15, 1989 
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